Conflict Influence On The Provision Of Aid Politics Essay

affair Influence On The Provision Of promote Politics EssayThe question of how dispute influences the provision of help oneself subtly posits a normative assumption the reader is immediately positioned on the affirmative position of whether concern should be provided in a fight smirch. This reflects a new reality in the global political landscape the proliferation of involution involving a high gentlemans gentlemanitarian cost has led the international association to prioritise intervention over sovereignty. As Duffield notes, largely through and through a series of ad hoc Security Council resolutions, a key festering has been the ability of the unify Nations to provide assuagement assistance even under war conditions.1Essenti everyy, the changing nature of contrast has provoked changes in the role and function of forethought, and when, and by whom it is provided. I will be exploring the positioning that the relatively new strategy of providing countenance during encroach has led to an inevitably dynamic interactive relationship between conflict and serve, characterised by both legal/ moral quandaries and language problems.Initially I would like to define what is meant by the term conflict. Contemporary conflicts, as described by Kaldor, ar a mixture of war, crime and human rights violations.2They are no immenseer inter-state affairs participated in by actors delineated a foresightful traditional lines, i.e. soldiery vs. host. They are typically intra-state, characterised by low intensity war outlying(prenominal)e they are facilitated by technological advances such as low cost, lightweight weaponry and speedier conference they receive much international attention, both from the media and the international/ political union and whilst not existence inter-state, they whitethorn be facilitated by external involvement. Duffield suggests these new wars are a permanent characteristic of fragmented crisis areas, which lack political and f rugal cohesion.3Duffield explains that these areas outside of the stintingally and politically integrated blocs- endnot be understood in constituted terms of war and peace. Their defining feature is ongoing instability, and furthermore this is not a temporary phase in the process of development and mutation toward all-embracing democracy (i.e. modernisation)4.A more appropriate framework than the binary war/ peace opposition is to situate contemporary violence on a conflict-to-peace continuum. This spectrum perspective firstly accommodates the varying levels of intensity inside a conflict, and also situates conflict in a timeframe. In needing the interaction of conflict and assistant, one must not only consider the influence of the actual conflict enacted in the present exclusively the influence of past conflicts, and how aid might avoid or alter potential conflicts in the future. The continuum should be viewed as linear but non-teleological, in that it includes the causes of conflict, conflict itself, and post-conflict situations which have the potential for repeated conflict. Uvin defines the transition from a state of conflict to a state of peace as a process with no definitive endpoints Sustainable peace is not or sothing that can be produced rapidly it is not something that can be mastered technically, with a fixed formula it is not even a clear state that can be achieved once and for all as much as a process.5Conflict can also be delineate in opposition to peace. Within Suhrke and Buckmasters exposition of a transition to peace, the conflictual position on the spectrum is also elucidated Peace stabilization involves securing transition from a military to a political mode of conflict demobilisation, return of refugees, reintegration and mechanisms for dealing with the conflict in political terms (elections, role sharing), relief (especially for IDPs and refugees), and immediate reconstruction to offer alternatives to war economy.6As mentio ned before, contemporary conflicts involve a range of less-clearly defined actors. Conventional distinctions such as state vs. state or state vs. rebel have dissolved, and the lines demarcating dickhead state/ legitimate state/ military, civilian/ military/ rebel/ revolutionary are very much bended. In relation to this dissolution of clearly defined actor roles, an overarching feature of contemporary conflict is that whilst some are waged as legitimate rebellions over genuine grievances pursuing the verifiable of social transformation, the sustaining of conflict itself is often the objective. In a situation with few economic opportunities and resource scarcity, the ability to wage war is the wielding of economic and political power in itself, and sustaining the conflict may paradoxically be synonymous with sustaining the means of life. Conflicts may not just be the outcome of deep, structural causes, but also actors attempts to address and weather these causes.It is also necessar y to define what aid is. Aid can- theoretically at least- be categorised as either relief (humanitarian assistance) or development aid. The former will focus on material goods ( diet, medicine, clothes and shelter) and function (water, security), and will be provided in the short(p) term, as emergency situations dictate. The latter will concentrate on addressing structural inequalities and divisions, aiming to transform and reconstruct society through capacity building in political, economic and social spheres and will generally be disbursed within a longer term framework. Aid is for the relief of slimy and human needs, both the immediate need and the causes of that need. Aid is delivered by NGOs (e.g. Oxfam), international organisations (e.g. the UN) and governments (e.g. DFID) although these actors may overlap, conflict and co-operate.However, this neat categorisation of aid is not theoretically or practically possible. It seems that whether relief constitutes aid is disputed. The OECD says Official development assistance is defined as those flows to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients and to multilateral development institutions which are i. provided by authorised agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies and ii. individually transaction of which a) is administered with the publicity of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective and b) is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per cent).7This definition should not technically include relief or humanitarian assistance, as generally these do not fulfil the second beat. However, other literature does consider humanitarian assistance as a (growing) part of ODA the share of humanitarian assistance has risen sharply, from about 3 per cent of Official Development assistant (ODA) in the 1980s to close to 10 per cent in recent year s.8The problem of, and reasons for, separating these different sorts of aid in practical situations will be discussed further.It is withal useful to consider aid in terms of a continuum relief-to-development. The purpose and goals of aid modulate along this spectrum, and may in fact be in opposition as well as converge. Short term provision of relief aid which bypasses a weak state will serve to forcefulnessively weaken that state further, hindering future development efforts. For example, Natsios expound how the effect of one the ICRCs interventions in Somalia in 1992, intended to improve food security, had other long term negative effects. Their soup kitchens actually destabilised society socially and politically, because the starving remained relocated near to the kitchens instead of returning to plant crops. Whilst the ICRCs methods preserved life, they had other long term effects.9The core humanitarian value acknowledging a responsibility to prevent human suffering, whethe r in the short or long term- underlies both relief and development aid. Traditional, apolitical, neutral humanitarianism emerged, as Duffield explains, from the inhumane political bias cultivated within the Cold War climate.10Humanitarianism is based on qualities of impartiality (need being the only criteria for distribution) and disinterest (not taking sides or interfering in a conflict). This is emphasised in UN Resolution 46/182, clarifying the provision of aid in conflict situations. Guiding Principle two states Humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality.11Duffield initially concluded that neutrality is unimaginable in the new wars, since any assistance necessarily has political effects.12He also charted the development of a New Humanitarianism which acknowledges that there are grievous difficulties in the real life provision of apolitical, impartial and neutral aid.13Duffield later suggested that humanita rianism had changed its modus operandi, supposedly maintaining neutrality with practices such as negotiated access and the more small variable consent.14Whatever the practical feasibility of neutrality and impartiality, it is important to bear in mind the importance effects of trying to maintain these principles in set up to preserve the likelihood of access Duffield suggests it is a useful tool of practical diplomacy.15As well as delivery problems, such as maintaining impartiality, humanitarian aid faces a legal problem in conflict settings such as the adhering to the responsibility of providing aid whilst not in the process of intervention impinging on sovereignty. Chapter One, Article 2, Paragraph 7 of the UN engage forbids intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign state Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state 16UN Resolution 46/182 reinforc es state sovereignty but also emphasises the states responsibility towards those needing aid. Guiding Principle six states States whose populations are in need of humanitarian assistance are called upon to facilitate the work of these organizations in implementing humanitarian assistance, in particular the supply of food, medicines, shelter and health care, for which access to victims is essential.17Within this Resolutions framework, the state has had a much greater role in the delivery and co-ordination of humanitarian assistance but expectations of responsibility are stressed as well. This provides aid donors and international organisations with a clearer duty and right to intervene in situations where a predatory state blocks aid to one or more population groups.Who provides aid to whom is a complex problem, and in the reality of a conflict situation it involves a series of moral tradeoffs. Duffield pinpoints a cant from apolitical aid to an acknowledgement of aids political eff ects the new humanitarianism involves a shift in the centre of gravity of policy a air from saving lives to supporting social processes and political outcomes.18However, he is, as am I, uncomfortable with the new allowance and its willingness to sacrifice lives today on the promise of development tomorrow.19He explains that the consequentialist ethics of the new humanitarianism in holding out the possibility of a divulge tomorrow as a price worth paying for suffering today, has been a major source of the normalisation of violence and complicity with its perpetrators.20Unfortunately, Duffield is left in the aforesaid(prenominal) position as anyone attempting to find a clear-cut, positive substance to provide aid. There are problems with either viewing aid as apolitical or political. The most responsible path through this quandary is to look in detail at the actual dynamics between conflict and aid, and to approach each particular conflict situation individually with these dynami cs in mind.The dynamic influence conflict has on aid results primarily from the new types of actors tortuous in conflict. For example, a state which offends human rights (i.e. not fulfilling its security role) has a direct impact on how aid will be provided. Unable to ignore the human rights offences of predatory states, donors will target aid and incentivise it for peace. Uvin suggests that the international community has become active in so-called democratic policing a matter which would have been considered far beyond the reach of ODA only a decade ago.21The tools used to foster democracy and other liberal goals include, among others, the use of conditionality, which has evolved into less strong-armed methods such as DFIDs promotion of ownership, alignment and harmonization, as detailed by Goodhand.22 only if it is unclear how these positive governance-related behavioural results can be used as tools in the same way that aid can be leveraged.Conflict attracts aid it creates a n eed for it, and negatively impacts successful disbursement and provision in a variety of ways. Aid is unavoidably a source of political, economic and social power and fighters will use it for their objectives. Conflict is a perverse economic, political and social system, an imbalance of powers when the power associated with aid is introduced into that system or conferred on one party, it cannot be expected to fulfil a pacifying role, immediately solving the conflict and its effects. It will interact with, and within, the conflicts dynamics.Parties involved in conflict will misuse, deplete and misdirect aid. Lischer outlines these firstly, aid will be given to combatants, both unknowingly, and on purpose (in efforts to adhere to the impartiality criterion of humanitarian aid). For example, after the Rwandan genocide of 1994 and massive subsequent refugee movements into neighbouring countries, UN aid was disbursed in refugee camps in eastern Zaire. These camps and aid received were c ontrolled largely by the RDR, a combatant group of Hutus who had perpetrated genocide. Secondly, Lischer notes that as well as supporting combatants, aid will support their dependents (families, political supporters) thus allowing them to use their resources to pursue conflict. Thirdly, aid will be coercively taken instead of donated. Lischer outlines the following methods of diversion Refugee leaders levy war tax on refugee populations refugee leaders control distribution, militant leaders divert aid by inflating population numbers, raiding and stealing.23The resource scarce and hungry dynamics of conflict means aid inevitably supports combatants, thus sustaining conflict.Conflict also creates the economic conditions in which aid is expected to function. Donors may intend aid to work in one way, but the mount of the conflict economy will distort this intended impact and actual provision of aid may differ greatly from operational policy. War economy and war markets will be reinf orced. Natsios details the way in which this was evident in Somalia. Civil war, drought and resulting famine meant that attempts to improve food security were distorted by the perverse dynamics of Somalias conflict economy. Natsios explains that the scarcity of food in Somalia increased its value as food aid was disbursed, relief food was an attractive objective of plunder.24In addition, market necessitate was driving some of the looting the normal disposition of merchant classes supporting law, order and stability as essential to commercial exchange was reversed, because of distorted markets.25Conflict and aid also interacted to produce very variable food prices rather than affordably low ones, as the influx of food aid was supposed to produce. Natsios explains how prices fluctuated, rising as warlords hoarded substantial tonnage, and dropping as these same warlords dumped food on the market preceding the US airlift. As flooding the market had little effect in the conflict contex t, OFDA began a policy of monetization. However, even though a reduction in food value was achieved, the effect of this aid policy had an adverse effect due to the conflict economy. Instead of making food relatively invaluable and improving security, the drop in food prices increased the level of violence as warlords and thieves same stole a greater volume of food to make up for its diminished value.26The conflict economys dynamics meant peverted the intended effects of food aid.The disbursement of aid is not only prey to conflicts perverse economic forces, but to its socially divisive nature. Conflict is waged along and facilitated by divisions in society (ethnic, territorial, religious) and the provision of aid will be influenced by these cleavages aid will reflect adverse group relations. This can be on an operational policy level (ostensibly aiding refugees, but prolonging their segregation from society), and at the level of delivery Anderson suggests that the practice of targe ting aid reinforces divisions rather than connectors in societies.27However, if social connectors are facilitated and reinforced instead of undermined, as Natsios exemplifies in the outcome of Somalia, aid can avoid the vicious effect of conflict on social dynamics. He details how the irrigation project in the Shabeelle valley bolstered Somalian societys connectors, the normalize natural stabilizing force of the clan elders, as they were given the resources and money to create employment.28Conflict engenders a need for aid but also jeopardises its integrity, as the humanitarian imperative to fulfil this need means aid donors interact with less than ethically robust actors still pursuing conflict. In order to accession access and begin peace building, a short-term pragmatic attitude is required, resulting in engagement with combatants in positions of control, and thus conferring legitimacy, both domestically and internationally. Uvin posits a slew scale of principle/ pragmatism/ complicity which is positions the problem usefully as policy slides down this scale, the dangers of ignoring the humanitarian objective reform into being complicit in or fuelling an illegitimate actors actions.29Conflict creates banquets in state function, which aid presumes to fill (not close) for its very nature is substitutive. Uvin points out that During conflicts, many governments cease functioning, particularly in areas with heavy violence.30Filling this gap of capacity or service delivery may have the adverse effect of weakening and undermining state and local capacities for example governance in Afghanistan, and food provision in Somalia.31Stewart and Samman suggest that in the long term, conflict and the aid it attracts perpetuates the situation Even when CONFAID does help prevent starvation in the short term, it can prolong suffering over many years by contributing to the financing of the war and diverting people from their normal economic activities.32The political conte xt of conflict influences the provision of aid dramatically. By political context, I mean that a) aids impact is unavoidably politicised, and b) the political context and objectives of international involvement, and various telephone receiver actors, will be influential.The political context of donor actors involved in the conflict-peace continuum, will determine how aid is used. For example, Goodhand and Sedra argue that international engagement in Afghanistan has been Janus headed emphasis between one face prioritizing the war on terror and short term stability and the other durable peace through state building.33The donors short term focus and commitment due to domestic political pressures meant that long term goals were undermined.The political context of non-state actors receiving aid is also a factor. Lischer argues that the extent to which a group is politicised will determine for what purpose aid is used, and how successfully. The greater the level of political cohesion am ong the refugees, the more likely they (or their leaders) will attempt to divert refugee relief in support of their political and military goals.34The political context of state recipients can influence the on-the-ground provision of aid in adverse ways. Stewart and Samman contrast the way in which successful aid provision depended on the political stance of the governments in Sudan in 1983 and Mozambique in 1975- 1982 CONFAID was manipulated and used to pursue conflict by a predatory government in Sudan, but in Mozambique the Frelimo government, whilst less predatory, was still associated with aid provision. This made the opposing Renamo areas inaccessible despite having an impartial mandate.35Furthermore, the combination of political contexts of both recipient and donor results influences at whom the aid is targeted Uvin exemplifies this in Rwanda, many donors abandoned targeting for fear of being seen as partial to any one side in Afghanistan, they strengthened targeting to women , for fear of acquiescing to government policies that exclude women.36In conclusion, having looked at the intricacies of the conflict-aid dynamic, I would like to position the question of conflicts influence on aid within the wider spectrum of debate about conflict. Conflict is often seen as a breakdown or transgression from a normal state of affairs however, as Anderson notes, it is normalcy that gave rise to the emergency initially.37Relinquishing this idea will obviously have an effect on the role that aid is expected to play it is not except a temporary measure, but a whole new start. Related to this is the fact that conflicts have structural (deep) and immediate (light) causes requiring long-term development and short-term aid solutions, but the two are rarely successfully reconciled. As Uvin notes, outside pressure for democracy tends to take more time, consistency, knowledge, finesse and commitment than the international community typically has.38This is perhaps because the traditional view of conflict attributes blame to internal problems whereas aid and development are imposed, technically and professionally, from a sphere external to the conflict. But as Uvin explains, aid can be an integral part of the system which, in the case of Rwanda, perpetrates and perpetuates structural violence development aid interacts in mixed and important ways with profound social processes of inequality, exclusion, humiliation, impunity, and despair, on which the genocidal edifice was built Domestic politics are inseparable from external aid foreign aid is constitutive of domestic processes.39Lastly, the impossibility of neutrality and apolitical action within complex situations of conflict does not mean that we must retreat back to neutrality politicisation is inevitable. Beyond neutrality is an acknowledgement of responsibility, for both the successful and unsuccessful results of aid provision.3448 words.